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THE FAR SIDE OF PARADOX: STATE
REGULATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
EFFECTS OF COAL MINING
K. W. JAMES ROCHOW*
INTRODUCTION

This article will analyze the prospects for effective state regulation of the environmental effects of coal mining.' The many new
and important mandatory requirements which the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 19772 imposes on state regulatory
programs3 will provide the focus of this article. It will be divided
into three sections: a "three-stage" analysis of the Act; an analysis
of the regulatory framework of federal-state relations under the
Act; and an analysis of developments in federal and state regulatory programs from the date of passage of the SMCRA to the
present.
I.
A.

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF THE AcT:
THE THREE STAGES OF REGULATION

Background-The Paradox of State Programs

The Act is founded on a paradox. On the one hand, it was
enacted because of the disastrous consequences resulting from the
historic failure of the states to regulate coal mining effectively.' On
the other hand, it expressly confers upon the states the primary
responsibility for its administration and enforcement. 5
* A.B., Cornell University 1968; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School
1971; presently Assistant Attorney General of Pennsylvania and Director, Philadelphia Office, Office of Chief Counsel, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Resources.
I This article expresses the personal views of the author. It neither purports to
express the official position of Pennsylvania nor of state regulatory agencies.
2 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328 (West Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as the Act
and the SMCRA]. The Act was enacted on August 3, 1977. On August 11, 1978,
Congress amended § 712 of the Act to increase the amount of appropriations available to the Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior for administering the Act. Act of Aug. 3, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-343, 92 Stat. 473, reprintedin
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEws.
' For the sake of succinctness, all references in this article to "regulation" or
"regulatory programs" will exclusively encompass the regulation of the environmental effects of coal mining.
See 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201(c),(g),(h) (West Supp. 1978).
Id. § 1201(f).
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The destructive impacts and astronomical costs imposed by
coal mining on the public and industry are now well documented
and generally recognized. They include water pollution, water supply depletion, land erosion, elimination of topsoil and productive
subsoil, flooding, land subsidence, blasting damage to property
and health, stream obstruction (sedimentation), aesthetic nuisances, and the disruption of community life.' Acid mine drainage
has ravaged over 3,000 miles of streams in Pennsylvania alone.
There is an undeniable legacy of destruction associated with
coal mining which testifies to the laxity or nonexistence of state
regulation. Nonetheless, the argument was made in opposition to
the passage of the Act that state regulation of coal mining was
rapidly evolving and had reached the point where it was effective
enough so that federal regulation of coal mining was not needed.
Indeed, many state officials opposed the passage of the Act. Typical was the comment from the then Lieutenant Governor, now
Governor, of Virginia, John M. Dalton: "I urge you to consider not
what the States weren't doing 10 years ago, but what they are
doing now."' Congress was not convinced by this argument. As the
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs reported:
Hearings conducted . . .in January and February of [1977]
...established that the problems associated with coal mining
have not gone away. Indeed, as new mining technologies have
evolved, new problems have been identified. . . .Moreover,
despite claims from some quarters that State reclamation laws
have improved so significantly that Federal mining standards
are no longer needed, the hearing record abounds with evidence
that this simply is not the case. For a variety of reasons, including the reluctance of the State to impose stringent controls on
its own industry, serious abuses continue.8
B.

Structure of the Federal ActThree Stage Analysis

The most obvious testimony to the laxity of state regulation,
including that immediately preceding the passage of the Act, is the
6 Id. § 1201(c); see generally H.R. RzP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 58,
reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEws 593; APPALACHIAN REGIONAL
COMMissioN, AcID MINE DRAINAGE IN APPALACHIA, H.R. Doc. No. 180, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess: 24 (1969).
7 H.R. REP. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 192, reprinted in [1977] U.S.

& AD. NEWS 721.
1Id. at 58, reprinted in [19771 U.S.

CODE CONG.

CODE CONG.

& AD. NEws 596.
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fact that the Act will require substantial improvements and revisions to the regulatory programs of every state in which coal is
mined.9 One way to analyze coal mining regulation is to view it as
proceeding through three stages: (1) total or almost total lack of
regulation; (2) imposition of basic regulatory standards minimally
necessary to protect the environment; and (3) imposition of a more
sophisticated regulatory scheme which attempts comprehensively
to evaluate and control all the effects of mining upon the environment. The Act, according to this analysis, represents both a "catch
up" requirement for those states which have not yet achieved an
effective second stage regulatory program and, at the same time,
a requirement that all states devise and carry out an effective third
stage regulatory program.
1.

Second Stage Regulation-The Initial Regulatory Program

The Act describes an initial regulatory program primarily designed to bring coal mining operations" into expeditious compliance with basic second stage regulatory standards. Section 502(c)
refers to eight performance standards from among numerous performance standards specified in section 515. These eight initial
performance standards encompass the basic minimum requirements of an effective program of mining regulation. This includes
the elimination of highwalls and requiring backfilling to approximate original contour as provided in section 515(b)(3); the segregation, storage and replacement of topsoil and productive subsoil as
provided in section 515(b)(5); the restoration of land affected by
mining including the establishment of a diverse, effective and permanent vegetative cover as provided in section 515(b)(19); and the
prevention and abatement of polluting discharges after, as well as
during, mining as provided in section 515(b)(10)."
In contrast to the final regulatory program which will come
into effect on June 3, 1980, thirty-four months from the date of
enactment, the initial regulatory program came into effect for new
operations on February 3, 1978, six months from the date of enact' This assumes that all stages will attempt to obtain delegation of the enforcement responsibilities under the Act ("primacy") from the Department of the Interior. See 30 U.S.C.A. § 1253 (West Supp. 1978). As of this writing it appears as if
every state will apply for primacy.

10The Act regulates underground mining and coal refuse disposal as well as
surface mining. See text accompanying notes 14-20, infra.
" 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1265(b)(3), (5), (19), (10) (West Supp. 1978).
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ment.'2 The Act requires all operations to comply with the initial
regulatory requirements
by May 3, 1978, nine months from the
3
date of enactment.'
2.

Second Stage Regulation-The Permanent Regulatory
Program

In addition to the initial regulatory program, the Act sets forth
requirements for a permanent regulatory program. The permanent
regulatory program attempts to build upon the initial regulatory
program and requires operators to comply with an extensive set of
second stage requirements.
The structure of the permanent regulatory program reflects
the basic requirements contained to a lesser or greater degree in
current state legislation: operators must submit a reclamation
plan and obtain a permit before beginning mining operations;"
operators must post a bond covering reclamation expenses in case
they fail to fulfill the reclamation requirements of the Act;' operations are subject to enforcement inspections and a wide range of
penalties for failure to comply with the requirements of the Act,
including abatement orders,'" cessation orders,'7 injunctive relief,',,
civil penalties, 9 and criminal penalties.'" In addition, the regulatory authority' is required to issue rules and regulations setting
both "end of pipe" and "best management practices" performance
standards" or, more precisely, elaborating upon the unusually spell Id. § 1253(a), 1254(a).
'1 Id. § 1252(c).
" Id. §§ 1257, 1258.
'5 Id. § 1259.
" Id. § 1271(a)(3).
' Id. § 1271(a)(2).
IAId. § 1271(c).
" Id. § 1268(a).
2 Id. §§ 1268(e)-(g).

21 "Regulatory authority" refers to the governmental entity, either federal or
state or both, responsible for enforcing the SMCRA in a given state. See 30
U.S.C.A. §§ 1252-1254 (West Supp. 1978).
2 In conventional terminology, "end of pipe" is used to designate standards
which set requirements to be achieved; for example, effluent limitations on discharges. "End of pipe" is usually contrasted with "best management practices"
which designates prescribed methods or processes; for example, topsoil segregation.
See 30 U.S.C.A. § 1265(b)(5) (West Supp. 1978). Although the industry puts great
emphasis on this distinction, it is illusory in most cases. For example, the requirement to return land affected by coal mining operations to approximate original
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cific performance standards contained in the Act for pollution control, land restoration, waste disposal, and nuisance prevention and
abatement.n
3.

Second Stage Regulation-Underground Mining and Coal
Refuse Disposal

In addition to regulating surface coal mining operations, the
Act regulates underground coal mining and coal refuse disposal
operations.' Its regulation of underground mining operations and
contour contained in § 515(b)(3) prescribes both a process and an end result. 30
U.S.C.A. § 1265(b)(3) (West Supp. 1978).
" 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251(b), 1265, 1266 (West Supp. 1978).
21 Section 701(28) of the Act defines "surface coal mining operations"-its
operative phrase-comprehensively:
(A) activities conducted on the surface of lands in connection with a
surface coal mine or subject to the requirements of section 1266 surface
operations and surface impactsincident to an undergroundcoal mine, the
products of which enter commerce or the operations of which directly or
indirectly affect interstate commerce. Such activities include excavation
for the purpose of obtaining coal including such common methods as
contour, strip, auger, mountaintop removal, box cut, open pit, and area
mining, the uses of explosives and blasting, and in situ distillation or
retorting, leaching or other chemical or physical processing, and the
cleaning, concentrating, or other processing or preparation, loading of
coal for interstate commerce at or near the mine site: Provided,however,
That such activities do not include the extraction of coal incidental to the
extraction of other minerals where coal does not exceed 16 2/3 per centum
of the tonnage of minerals removed for purposes of commercial use or sale
or coal explorations subject to section 1262 of this Act; and
(B) the areas upon which such activities occur or where such activities disturb the natural land surface. Such areas shall also include any
adjacent land the use of which is incidental to any such activities, all
lands affected by the construction of new roads or the improvement or
use of existing roads to gain access to the site of such activities and for
haulage, and excavations, workings, impoundments, dams, ventilation
shafts, entryways, refuse banks, dumps, stockpiles, overburden piles,
spoil banks, culm banks, tailings, holes or depressions, repair areas, storage areas, processing areas, shipping areas and other areas upon which
are sited structures, facilities, or other property or materials on the surface, resulting from or incident to such activities.
30 U.S.C.A. § 1291(28) (West Supp. 1978) [emphasis added]. The emphasized
language, "surface impacts incident to an underground coal mine," is in vacuo
arguable susceptible to being read as applying only to the most direct effects of
underground mining, (for example, soil removal in site preparation). Other sections
of the Act, however, indicate that the phrase is to be applied broadly. See 30
U.S.C.A. § 1266 (West Supp. 1978) (especially § 1266(9) which deals with the
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coal refuse operations represents a basic requirement for a minimally effective second stage regulatory program.
Underground mining not only poses most of the same environmental problems associated with surface mining, but it also presents additional, serious environmental problems. Underground
mining directly affects the surface of the land in a manner similar
to surface mining, although not to the same areal extent. In underground mining operations, sites must be cleared for such things as
access roads, mine entries, conveyor belts, plants to sort coal refuse
and sort and prepare coal, and railway lines to ship mined coal to
preparation plants or markets. In the course of this activity, vegetation and overburden are removed and sometimes coal is actually
mined by the surface mining method. But in addition to the environmental problems it shares with surface mining, underground
mining poses its own severe environmental problems. For example,
extraction of coal by the underground method causes the land
surface to subside by removing surface supporting underground
strata. In addition, by creating voids (into which naturally occurring groundwater flows) and by creating strata fracturing, underground mining creates polluted underground pools and lakes which
because of groundwater migration and hydraulic pressure are often
difficult or impossible to contain and sometimes literally break
through the surface of the ground."
Even the best known current method of abating post-mining
polluting discharges from underground mines-containing the
mine pool by sealing all openings with watertight concreteactually sanctions the continued pollution of the groundwater.
Moreover, it has not been established that underground mine
seals will effectively prevent pollution over time. Seals and the
surrounding strata into which they are anchored are subject to
such weakening natural forces as water and wind erosion, rock
shifts, and the freezing and thawing cycle. In any event, hydroregulation of the hydrologic impacts of underground mining). Accord, 30 Fed. Reg.

62,695-700 (1977) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. §§ 717.11-717.20).
21 See Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871 (1974)
(opinion and order of Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversing lower court's denial
of Commonwealth's prayer for permanent relief requiring underground mine operator to treat or abate pollution), 472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d 461 (1977) (opinion and order
of Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirming lower court order granting permanent
equitable relief on remand), appeal denied mem., 434 U.S. 807 (1977). See also
Note, Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co.-The Burden of TreatingAcid Mine
Drainage,80 W. VA. L. REv. 519 (1978).
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static pressure often forces water, which is contained by sealing,
through the strata in an unpredictable manner at unanticipated
zones of weakness." The extent of the environmental harm caused
by underground mining is illustrated by its disproportionate contribution to acid mine drainage in Appalachia:
Underground mines produce 71.3% of all mine acid drainage, although they constitute only 58% of the number of individual sources. Inactive underground mines, constituting 53%
of the sources, contribute 52.5% of the total acid mine drainage.
Active underground mines on the other hand, contribute 18.8%
of the total acid mine drainage, although they constitute only
5% of the total sources. Thus not only is the acid mine drainage
problem concentrated geographically, it is also concentrated in
one segment of the mining industry.?
Coal refuse disposal operations also create special environmental
problems. The present practice of disposing of waste coal and associated waste minerals in mountainous piles on the land surface
often results in severe problems of stability, long term water pollution, air pollution, fire hazards, and aesthetic nuisances.2
In addition to its regulation of surface mining, the Act's regulation of underground mining and coal refuse disposal operations
is especially important because it fills a regulatory void. Until the
passage of the Act, Pennsylvania was the only state which in some
fashion regulated all of the generally recognized adverse environmental effects of underground mining and coal refuse disposal operations.") This failure to regulate underground mining and coal
refuse disposal operations exemplifies the failure of state regulatory programs to achieve even complete second stage regulation.
Furthermore, the historic failure of many individuals and groups
dedicated to protecting the environmental quality (including those
26 Mine

Drainage Ends Cherry Run Fishing,Kittaning (Pa.) Leader Times,

Jan. 24, 1979.
2 371 A.2d at 466 [citation omitted]. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
declared that the water pollution problems posed by post-mining discharges from
underground mines have reached "a critical state". Id.
28 The much publicized Buffalo Creek disaster, in which impounded water
breached a coal refuse pile and resulted in over 125 deaths and approximately 1,000
homes destroyed is a dramatic example of the hazards posed by improperly managed coal refuse piles. See G. Stem, BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER IX (1977). Buffalo
Creek and similar examples of spectacular mismanagement tend to obscure the
more common and, in the aggregate, more serious problems caused by surface
disposal of inherently polluting and inherently combustible coal refuse material.
29 See generally PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 691.315 (Purdon 1977).
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who advocate the abolition of surface mining) to recognize the
severe environmental harm caused by underground mining, together with their concomitant promotion of underground mining
as an environmentally sound activity, 30 highlights the importance

of the Act's regulation of underground mining and provides an
ironic complement to the previous lack of regulation of under3
ground mining. '
4. Third Stage Regulation
Despite the importance of its requirement for national, uniform minimum standards, the most enduring and significant aspect of the Act should be its requirements for a third stage regulatory program. It is now apparent that a third stage regulatory
program is necessary to protect the public from the environmental
effects of coal mining operations and that a second stage regulatory
program is inadequate to do so. A third stage regulatory program
can be defined as one which is oriented toward evaluating the
cumulative effects of mining in a process which emphasizes: prevention rather than belated cure of environmental harm; the ag31The Act reflects in some measure the continuing myth that underground
mining is relatively benign. For example, § 402(a) reads in relevant part:
All operators of coal mining operations subject to the provisions of
this [Act] shall pay to the Secretary of the Interior, for deposit in the
fund [for public reclamation of inactive mines under Title IV vf the
Act], a reclamation fee of 35 cents per ton of coal produced by surface
coal mining and 15 cents per ton for coal produced by underground mining or 10 per centum of the value of the coal at the mine as determined
by the Secretary, whichever is less ...
30 U.S.C.A. § 1232(a) (West Supp. 1978). The basic reason for the differential in
tonnage fee assessment was to encourage underground mining as an environmen.
tally preferable alternative to surface mining. In addition, § 102(k) provides that
one of the purposes of the Act is to "encourage the full utilization of coal resources
through the development and application of underground extraction technologies."
Id. § 1202(k).
3' See SIERRA CLUB COAL MINING POLICY (1971) (superseded by SIERRA CLUB
COAL MINING POLICY (1976)); see also ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INsTIUTE AND CENTER
FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, THE STRIP MINE HANDBOOK (1978). The latter of these
publications is intended to help citizens enforce the Act's initial regulatory pro-

gram. It fails, however, to discuss or describe the methods of underground mining
and coal refuse disposal and their regulation. It does contain one reference in a
parenthetical note stating that the Act covers the "surface effects of deep mining."
Id. at 10. By virtue of its isolated reference to underground mining, as well as its
potentially misleading emphasis of surface effects, the Handbook highlights the
continuing failure on the part of the environmentalist community to recognize the
environmental harm caused by underground mining.
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gregate and synergistic effect of mining operations on the environment; and the compatibility of mining operations with land use
policies and plans.
The nature of environmental harm caused by mining necessitates the imposition of a third stage regulatory program. To take
one example, a third stage regulatory program should require the
prevention of harm through the multidisciplinary review of thoroughly prepared permit applications and the imposition of appropriate conditions in those permits which are granted. This emphasis is necessary because one of the most salient characteristics of
environmental harm from mining is that it cannot be satisfactorily
remedied at all, or only at great expense in what are often unsatisfactory ways. 32 A concomitant characteristic of the environmental
harm caused by coal mining is that it is long lasting. For example,
many post-mining discharges of acid mine drainage if unabated
will last beyond the foreseeable future. "
The relationship between Pennsylvania's current regulatory
program and the requirements of the Act illustrates the Act's third
stage regulatory requirements. It has been widely stated that the
Act is based largely upon Pennsylvania's mining legislation and
regulatory program which is perceived to be the most effective in
the country.3 *I t is true that Pennsylvania's regulatory program has
imposed second stage regulatory requirements on operators for
approximately ten years prior to the passage of the Act.3 5 Although
Pennsylvania's operators have been required for almost a decade
to comply with such basic standards as backfilling to approximate
original contour, topsoil segregation and replacement, and pollution prevention and abatement both during and after mining,
Pennsylvania's regulatory program nevertheless will have to be
revised and supplemented in order to be compatible with the Act.
2

See Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d 461,

appeal denied mem., 434 U.S. 807 (1977); Harmon Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 34

Pa. Commw. Ct. 610, 384 A.2d 289 (1978).
In Pennsylvania there is at least one post-mining discharge of acid mine
drainage which has lasted almost one hundred years. Theoretically, post-mining

discharges of acid mine drainage can last a thousand years or more, although some
will be significantly shorter in duration. Such factors as the rate of pyritic leaching
and groundwater inundation influence duration.
: For example, Representative Morris Udall of Arizona has at times expressed

this view in the author's presence.
2 See 1965 Pa. Laws No. 372 and 1970 Pa. Laws. No. 653, amendingthe Clean
Streams Law, 1937 Pa. Laws No. 1987 (codified in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.1
(Purdon 1977)).
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The following are examples of the revisions and supplements which
must be made to state regulatory programs in order to reflect the
third stage requirements of the Act and to qualify for regulatory
primacy.
a.

Hydrologic Evaluation Prior to Operation

The Act requires a s6phisticated hydrologic evaluation of proposed mining operations as part of the permit application process.
Section 507(b)(11) requires the permit reviewing agency to consider all the probable hydrologic consequences of the proposed
mining operation both on and off the site."6 As part of that permit
review process, the agency must evaluate the probable cumulative
impacts of all anticipated mining upon the hydrology of the area.
This review includes impacts on water quantity as well as water
quality. Among other things, this requirement should enable a
more rational evaluation of the area wide impact of mining and
allow the regulatory authority to protect watersheds by developing
innovative regulatory techniques such as limiting the amount of
mining in a watershed at any one time and limiting the total
amount of mining in a watershed. As an example of the type of
information this section requires, seasonal flow data (entailing a
comprehensive program of hydrologic monitoring over different
seasons of the year) will have to be collected and evaluated before
a permit can be issued. The performance standards of section 515
reflect this emphasis on evaluating and protecting the hydrologic
regimeY For example, the operation must restore the recharge
capacity of the mined area to approximate premining conditions. "
b.

Monitoring Requirements and Experimental Permits

Closely allied with the requirement of full evaluation of the
environmental consequences of mining operations is the requirement that the permittee monitor the environmental effects of operations during and after mining. Every mining permit issued becomes, in effect, an experimental permit which serves as a vehicle
for the collection of field data. This field data can then be used to
refine the permit review process by collating predictions of environmental effects with actual results and to evaluate the effectiveness of pollution control and reclamation procedures. Monitoring
30 U.S.C.A. § 1257(b)(11) (West Supp. 1978).
Id. § 1265.
39 Id. § 1265(b)(10)(D).
37
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the effects of mining upon the groundwater is an especially important requirement and one which state regulatory programs have
neglected. Good examples of the monitoring requirements of, the
Act are the hydrologic monitoring, data keeping and analysis requirements of section 517(b)(2)2"
The hydrologic review and monitoring requirements illustrate
why third stage regulation is necessary to protect the public. It is
surprising, but true, that after almost a century of significant and
sometimes disastrous environmental harm caused by mining,
there exists a lack of understanding of important aspects of the
effects of coal mining." For example, even the natural processes
which cause acid mine drainage to form are not completely understood. Until a few years ago, it was assumed that the total sulfur
content of coal was the best indication of its potential for producing acid mine drainage; the higher the content, the greater the
potential. Professor Caruccio's work in recent years, however, has
plausibly theorized that the formation of acid mine drainage is a
complex phenomenon which is not controlled by a coal's total sulfur content, but is instead a function of the degree of reactivity of
the geochemical pyritic content of the coal; the geochemistry of the
aqueous environment of the coal and associated strata (i.e., the
capacity of the environment to neutralize acid mine drainage by
producing alkalinity); depositional environment of the coal (marine or fresh-water); and the presence of certain catalyzing bacteria
(the latter is perhaps epiphenomenal)."
Because the natural processes that produce many of coal mining's environmental effects are complex and not completely understood, the techniques of their prevention cannot be defined and
prescribed with maximum effectiveness. Using the formation of
acid mine drainage by way of example, the emphasis in Caruccio's
theory on the inhibition of acid mine drainage by alkalinity production would indicate that the best way to compose a backfill at
a surface mining operation would be to concentrate and bury acid
3' Id. § 1267(b)(2).

4OSee Alderman and Smith, Acid Mine Drainage: The Problem and the
Solution, CoAL MINING AND PROCESSING, August, 1977, at 66. Presumably, this re-

flects the historic emphasis by industry and government on production, not environmental protection. See McGinley and Sweet, Acid Coal Mine Drainage:Past
Pollution and Current Regulation, 17 DuQ. L. REv. 67, 69-70 (1978-1979).
It See F. CA~ucclo, J.C. FEaM, J. HORNE, G. GEIDEL AND B. BAGANZ, PALEOENVIRONMENT OF COAL AND ITS RELATION TO DRAINAGE QUALITY (EPA Doc. No. 60017-77067, June 1977).
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producing material at one point surrounded by the maximum areal
distribution of alkaline producing material. In contrast, conventional notions emphasize counteracting already formed acid mine
drainage with alkalinity evenly distributed throughout the layers
of the backfill.
.c. Reclamation
The Act also requires intensive and sophisticated review of the
reclamation potential of the proposed operation during the permit
application process. For example, the regulatory authority is authorized to evaluate as part of a permit application any climatological factors that are peculiar to the locality of the proposed operation1 and the productivity of the land prior to mining. This evaluation should include such factors as the historic average yield of
food, fiber, forage, or wood products obtained from the land under
high levels of management.43
d.

Land Use Planning

The Act requires that the relationship between proposed mining operations and land use policies and plans be taken into consideration during the permit application ,process. Specifically, the
Act requires as part of the permit application a statement of the
use proposed to be made of the land following reclamation, an
evaluation of the capacity of the land to support alternative uses,
the relationship of the proposed use to existing land use policies
and plans, and the comments of the surface owner and relevant
government agencies." The long term evaluation of the potential
effects of proposed operations thus extends under the Act to actual
post-mining land use as well as to water quality and quantity
problems. The SMCRA's land use planning requirements should
force an intelligent evaluation of the effects of the operation on the
surrounding community and should help foster an awareness of the
long term effects of a mining operation before a given operation
begins. These land use requirements also enable mining to be evaluated from a comparative perspective. For example, mining an
area which can be fully restored after mining is completed may,
under specific circumstances, be environmentally preferable to
J2

30 U.S.C.A. § 1257(b)(12) (West Supp. 1978).
Id. § 1258(a)(2)(C).
Id. § 1258(a)(3).
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putting the land to permanent residential or commercial use., ',
When read together with the cumulattve impact requirements of
the Act,"0 the land use requirements should allow regulatory authorities to use their permit granting authority to control, where
appropriate, the rate, sequence and location of mining. For example, the regulatory authority could use these requirements to direct
mining toward reclaiming areas previously harmed by inadequate
mining and reclamation practices.
e.

Coordination of Mining Regulation

Different types of mining activity affect each other and can
greatly increase the danger of environmental harm from miningrelated activities if they are not coordinated by the regulatory
authority. For example: surface mining operations and associated
blasting can weaken underground mine seals and barriers-inplace; underground mining operations can weaken barriers-inplace by mining too close to adjacent underground mines; and
governmert sponsored abandoned mine reclamation projects can
change the hydrology of an area which contains active mining
operations. 7 The Act contains several requirements which constitute at least partial recognition of the need for coordinated regulation of mining. Thus, the Act prohibits surface mining within 500
feet of active or inactive underground mines unless the regulatory
authority approves the nature, sequence and timing of the mining
operations and finds that they are in public interest.5
f.

Designation of Areas Unsuitable for Mining

The requirements of the Act relating to comprehensive analysis, regulatory coordination, and land use planning culminate in
11Of course the two courses of action are not necessarily mutually exclusive;
land is sometimes put to permanent residential or commercial use after it has been
mined.
See text accompanying notes 36 to 37 supra.
The problem of divided jurisdiction exacerbates the inherent difficulties of
coordinating mining regulation. In most state regulatory programs, different bureaucratic divisions regulate different aspects of mining. For example, in West
Virginia the water pollution aspects of surface mining are largely regulated by the
Water Resources Division of the Department of Natural Resources, while the bulk
of remaining regulation is performed by the Division of Reclamation of the Department of Natural Resources. See W. VA. CODE §§ 20-5-1 to -16 (1978 Replacement
Vol.) (water resources); W. VA. CODE §§ 20-6-1 to -32 (1978 Replacement Vol.)
(surface mining and reclamation).
"

Ix 30 U.S.C.A. § 1265(b)(12) (West Supp. 1978).
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the area wide regulatory requirements of section 522. 5 That section
requires the regulatory authority to develop a planning process to
identify those areas in which no coal mining should be authorized.
It requires the regulatory authority to designate areas unsuitable
for mining where reclamation is not technologically or economically feasible. It also authorizes the regulatory authority to designate areas unsuitable for mining where mining would: be incompatible with existing landuse plans or programs; damage historic,
cultural, scientific, aesthetic values or natural systems; or affect
renewable resource lands or natural hazard lands.'"
g.

Prime Farmlands and'Distance Restrictions

Several immediately effective provisions of the Act impose
upon operators land use related requirements which go beyond the
basic, minimum second stage of regulation.
For example, the Act requires extraordinary protection of
prime farmlands. Operations which may overlie prime farmlands
are required to conduct a soil survey to ascertain the exact location
of any prime farmlands." Permits to mine in prime farmlands may
be granted by the regulatory authority only if it finds, in writing,
that the operator has the technological capability to restore the
affected area and to meet the soil reconstruction standards of section 515(b)(7).5 1
Moreover, the Act requires the protection of natural, scenic,
historic and recreational areas. 53 Section 522(e) contains prohibitions against mining in (or within specified distances of) parks and
other protected areas. The Act also prohibits any operation which
will adversely affect a park or National Historic Site unless it is
jointly approved by the regulatory authority and the agency having
jurisdiction over the park or site."
4' Id.

§ 1272.

Operator error (whether or not ill motivated), lack of fail-safe technology,
and the often unpredictable environmental results of mining are among the reasons
why mining should not be allowed in areas designated environmentally sensitive.
1 30 U.S.C.A. § 1257(b)(16) (West Supp. 1978).
32 Id. 99 1265(b)(7), 1260(d)(1).
Section 522(e) of the SMCRA exempts two categories of mining operation
from its requirements: those which "exist" on the effective date of the Act and those
which possess "valid existing rights." 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(e)(1)-(5) (West Supp.
1978).
3130 U.S.C.A. § 1272(e)(3) (West Supp. 1978). In theory, section 515(b)(1) of
the Act can be read as a third stage regulation which goes so far as to authorize
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II.

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS UNDER THE ACT-STATE
OPPORTUNITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The preceding discussion has focused on the Act's response to
Congress' perception of inadequate state regulation of coal mining-a comprehensive federally mandated program which attempts to expedite initial compliance with second stage standards
and to require permanent compliance with a wide range of second
and third stage standards. The other aspect of the paradox is the
basis which forms the federal-state relationship under the Act: the
primary role which the SMCRA mandates to the states to administer and enforce its requirements. The SMCRA is unequivocal with
regard to the major role the states are to have in fulfilling its
requirements:
[Blecause of the diversity in terrain, climate, biologic, chemical, and other physical conditions in areas subject to mining
operations, the primary governmental responsibility for developing, authorizing, issuing, and enforcing regulations for surface mining and reclamation operations subject to this [Act]
should rest with the States. . ..

A.

State Enforcement of the Initial Regulatory Program

1. The Federal-State Scheme
Section 502 of the Act contemplates, in somewhat inexplicit
fashion, a significant state role in enforcement of the initial regulathe regulatory authority to impose energy policy related requirements on mining
operations by requiring them to "conduct surface coal mining operations so as to
maximize the utilization and conservation of the solid fuel resource being recovered
so that reaffecting the land in the future through surface coal mining can be minimized." 30 U.S.C.A. § 1265 (West Supp. 1978). In practice, section 515(b)(1) will
have little effect. In cases where maximization of coal recovery comes into conflict
with environmental protection standards, the Act's strong policy and requirements
for environmental protection should prevail. In cases where operators are so little
self interested that they fail to propose a method of operation which will maximize
recovery, the regulatory authority should refuse to require the operator to expand
his proposed operation and thus increase the chances for environmental disruption.
The "hopscotching" for easily accessible coal from one part of an operation to
another by undercapitalized or incompetent operators should be prevented by concurrent backfilling and similar requirements of the Act. One way to make section
515(b)(1) effective in practice would be to prohibit or strictly limit coal recovery
by the inefficient method of augering from the surface.
Id. § 1201(f); see also id. § 1202(g) ("assist the States in developing and
implementing a program to achieve the purposes of this [Act].").
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tory program. 6 At the same time, the initial regulatory program
contemplates a major role for the federal government. Section
502(e) requires that a federal enforcement program be in effect
within six months of the date of enactment,57 which coincides with
the date the initial regulatory standards took effect with regard to
new permits.0 This enforcement program lasts until the permanent regulatory program, either state or federal, comes into effect.
The initial program requires mandatory federal inspection of operations at least once every six months to ascertain compliance with
the initial performance standards." Sections 502(b) and 502(c)
require, first of all, that operations comply with the initial performance standards specified in those sections." Read in conjunctioi with section 502(e)'s initial federal enforcement requirements," those sections would seem to have clearly envisaged federal administration and enforcement of the initial performance
standards. The requirement that the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, (OSM), issue regulations setting
standards for the initial regulatory program confirms this view.2
This apparently well defined federal role is confused, however,
by the second half of the first sentence of section 502(b) which
states that "such permits" shall contain terms requiring compliance with the initial performance standards. The references to
permits in that subsection must be construed to mean state issued
permits, inasmuch as the last sentence indicates a state may issue
such permits. Moreover, no federal permits are contemplated until
and unless OSM institutes a permanent federal regulatory pro" Subsection (a) of § 502 can be dismissed. 30 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a) (West Supp.

1978). That subsection requires that any person who commences mining operations-by implication, on or after the effective date of the Act-must obtain a state
permit. Other than representing a pious affirmation of the necessity for acquiring
a state permit, this section has proved to have no effect and is therefore not relevant
to our discussion. Its failure stemmed from the following facts: the full-fledged
initial regulatory program was not scheduled to go into effect until six months from
the date of the Act; the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement
had no funding or staff until the initial regulatory program went into effect; and
the States have the legal authority under state law to require operators to obtain
permits.
30 U.S.C.A. § 1252(e) (West Supp. 1978).
"' Id. § 1252(b).
' Id. § 1252(e)(1).
0Id. 98 1252(b), (c).
"
62

Id. § 1252(e).

Id. §§ 1251(a), 1211(c)(2).
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gram in a state under section 504.63 This regulatory scheme is
further complicated by the fact that section 502(c) contains no
relevant reference to permit terms (although it requires compliance with the initial performance standards).64 Read literally, section 502(c)'s requirements lead to the absurd result that state permits for new operations must contain terms requiring compliance
with the initial regulatory standards, but state permits for existing
operations need not be amended to require compliance with the
initial performance standards.
This permit compliance scheme is further complicated by the
fact that information forming an integral part of the initial performance regulations applicable to all operations after May 3,
1978, can only be effectively obtained through the permit process.ru
The prime farmlands66 requirements, which are immediately effective, are dependent upon the state permit process for their administration and enforcement. These provisions explicitly require permit application information and set forth requirements for permit
grants and issuance.
2.

The Enforcement Realities

For the reasons set forth above, the central importance of the
permitting process in the initial regulatory program means, and
practically demands, that the states should have a major role in
its administration and enforcement. This major state role is also
necessitated by the federal inspection requirements of section
502(e).67 As a practical matter, OSM must place great reliance on
state inspections. In the first place, OSM has experienced long
delays in obtaining a budget from Congress and the first bare
beginnings of a federal inspection force only took to the field in late
Spring of 1978. Even when all federal inspectors are finally hired
and they have thoroughly familiarized themselves with the federal
requirements and the conditions in their district, it is highly unlikely that OSM will ever be able to hire the vast number of federal
11Id. § 1254. This article does not address the regulation of coal mining on
federal lands.
6 Id. § 1252(c).
" See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 62,685 (1977) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 715.17(a))
(permittees shall submit a surface monitoring program for approval by the regulatory authority).
30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1257(b)(16), 1260(d)(1), 1265(b)(7) (West Supp. 1978).
Id. § 1252(e).
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inspectors necessary to make regular inspections of every mining
operation in the country.s
3.

Legal Authority for State Enforcement

The major role which the states should have in administering

and enforcing the initial regulatory program having been established, the next questioii becomes what legal authority, if any, the
states have to enforce the initial performance standards. The Act
itself does not directly address the issue of state authority to require affirmative compliance with its initial performance standards. Section 505 does, in effect, prohibit states from taking actions inconsistent with (less stringent than) the Act." A state is
therefore forbidden from issuing permits requiring compliance
with terms less stringent than those of the Act.
Although the point is somewhat unclear, analogous case law
indicates that states may be able to enforce the federal initial
performance standards affirmatively. In Testa v. Katt,75 the
Section 502(e) institutionalizes federal-state cooperation (or at least communication) in the enforcement of the initial regulatory program. See 30 U.S.C.A. §
1252(e) (West Supp. 1978). It requires that the state regulatory authority file copies
of all inspection reports with OSM's Washington office and the appropriate OSM
regional office. Id. § 1252(e)(3). It further requires that OSM make a mandatory
inspection of an operation if the operation is found in violation of the SMCRA
during two consecutive state inspections. Id. § 1252(e)(2).
" Section 505 reads:
(a) No State law or regulation in effect on the date of enactment of
this Act, or which may become effective thereafter, shall be superseded
by any provision of this Act or any regulation issued pursuant thereto,
except insofar as such State law or regulation is inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act.
(b) Any provision of any State law or regulation in effect upon the
date of enactment of this Act, or which may become effective thereafter,
which provides for more stringent land use and environmental controls
and regulations of surface coal mining and reclamation operation than do
the provisions of this Actor any regulation issued pursuant thereto shall
not be construed to be inconsistent with this Act. The Secretary shall set
forth any State law or regulation which is construed to be inconsistent
with this Act. Any provision of any State law or regulation in effect on
the date of enactment of this Act, or which may become effective thereafter, which provides for the control and regulation of surface mining and
reclamation operations. for which no provision is contained in this Act
shall not be construed to be inconsistent with this Act.
30 U.S.C.A. § 1255 (West Supp. 1978).
7- 330 U.S. 386 (1947). Testa involved a consumer suit under the Emergency
Price Control Act, 55 Stat. 34, 55 U.S.C. § 925 (1944). The Rhode Island Supreme
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United States Supreme Court held that the supremacy clause requires state courts to enforce the substantive requirements of federal statutes when the state courts are empowered to decide similar
state law issues. The issue of whether the federal government can
requirethe states to enforce the initial regulatory program affirmatively in the absence of analogous state law requirements is more
difficult.7' The Supreme Court consciously avoided
deciding this
72
issue in its recent decision in EPA v. Brown.
4. Federal Carrots ind Clubs
Recognizing that the precise definition of the state's role in
enforcing the initial regulatory program (and the constitutional
limitations thereon) remains unclear, and that practical considerations nevertheless dictate that the states must play a major role
in its enforcement, OSM has taken the position that the states
should have or should obtain authority under state law to enforce
the initial performance standards. The willingness of the states to
obtain the necessary authority under state law and to cooperate
voluntarily in the enforcement of the initial regulatory program is
greatly enhanced by "carrots and clubs ' wielded by OSM in the
form of the approval or denial of grants.
OSM has the authority under section 705 of the SMCRA to
make grants to the states. 3 These grants include funds to cover the
additional expenses incurred by the states in administering and
enforcing the initial regulatory program.7" These grants are imporCourt had held that the Act was unenforceable in Rhode Island state courts because
it was penal in nature and of a foreign sovereign. Th' United States Supreme Court
reversed on the basis that state courts were not free under Article VI of the United
States Constitution to refuse to enforce the petitioner's claim:
When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Consti-

tution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the States,
and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy

of [Rhode Island] as if the act had emanated from its own legislature,
and should be respected accordingly in the courts of the State.
330 U.S. at 392 (quoting Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57
(1911)).

7,It has been suggested that Testa's application of art. VI is not limited to
those instances where an analogous state created right is identified. See Note,
FederalRights in State Courts, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 1551, 1555 (1960). See also Woonsocket Historical Society v. City of Woonsocket, 387 A.2d 530 (R.I. 1978).
72 431

U.S. 99 (1977).

7330 U.S.C.A. § 1295 (West Supp. 1978).

11See Id. § 1252(e)(4); 42 Fed. Reg. 62,704 (1977) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R.
§ 725.1-.25).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1979

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 3

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

tant to the states because they provide funding for additional staff
at a time when most state budgets are shrinking. This additional
funding should also allow the initial regulatory program to serve,
in fact as well, as theory, as a "dry-run" for enforcing many of the
requirements which must be incorporated in the states' permanent
regulatory programs.
B. Permanent Regulatory Program
Consistent with its stated purpose of delegating the primary
responsibility for its enforcement to the states, the Act authorizes
a state to assume exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of coal
mining under the Act when and if the state submits and OSM
approves a state plan for a permanent regulatory program under
section 502.15 States must submit and OSM must approve state
plans according to a time schedule established by the Act under
section 503.76

Section 503(a) specifies seven requirements which a state
must meet before its peimanent regulatory plan can be approved."
Essentially, section 503(a) requires that a state have the legal authority and adequate staff and funding to administer and enforce
a state regulatory program no less stringent than the requirements
of the Act. In the event a state fails to submit an acceptable plan
by June 3, 1980, OSM must administer and enforce a permanent
regulatory program in that state.18 Because it appears, as might be
expected, that every state in which coal mining exists will attempt
to qualify for primacy, the Act creates many problems and opportunities for federal and state relationships.
1. Funding
From the states' point of view, the most important role OSM
will play under the Act is as a source of funds for state programs.
Whatever the ineptitude the federal government may display in
other areas, it raises revenues with efficiency. State governments,
on the other hand, are often inefficient collectors of revenues at a
time when inflation is greatly increasing governmental costs.

7

Id. § 1252.
Id. § 1253.

Id. § 1253(a).
§ 1254(a).

7' Id.
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The consequences resulting from a~given state's inability to
fund such a program adequately will affect the public and industry
alike. Environmental protection will suffer if fewer inspections are
made. Permit applications will take an inordinately long time to
review (and the start of operations will be significantly delayed) if
there is insufficient staff to review such applications.
Funding is especially important for the states because one of
the SMCRA's explicit preconditions to obtaining primacy is a
showing that the state regulatory authority is sufficiently funded
so as to be able to administer and enforce the Act effectively." This
is not a trivial precondition. For example, Pennsylvania, which has
a comprehensive program of coal mining regulation, was the only
state to regulate all the environmental effects of underground mining prior to the passage of the Act." But there is a serious question
as to whether even Pennsylvania's program is sufficiently funded
at the present time to develop, administer and enforce a satisfactory state program under the Act."
The Act specifically authorizes OSM to make annual grants
to the states for the development, administration and enforcement
of state programs under the Act.2 The Act further provides that
the monies authorized by section 712 sliall also be used to reimburse the states for the administration and enforcement of the
initial performance standards." The maximum amounts of these
grants represent a substantial portion of the costs incurred by a
state in developing and running its coal mining regulatory program. Under section 705, a state is authorized to collect a percentage of the costs incurred by the state under the Act according to
the following schedule: 80% for the first year, 60% the second year
7130 U.S.C.A. § 1253(a)(3) (West Supp. 19781.
90See text accompanying note 29 supra.
61Pennsylvania, which has regulated surface mining since 1945,'requested an
initial regulatory program grant of 700,000 dollars from OSM for surface mining
regulation in 1979. This request represented almost a one-quarter increase in Pennsylvania's surface mining budget and was necessary to meet the requirements of
the initial regulatory program. The Act's authorization of grants of up to 80% of
the cost to the state for administering and enforcing the permanent program for the
first year (after obtaining primacy), is a realistic estimate of the incremental costs
which will be incurred. See note 89 and accompanying text, infra.
12See 30 U.S.C.A. § 1295 (West Supp. 1978); 42 Fed. Reg. 62,706-10 (1977) (to
be codified in 30 C.F.R. §§ 740.1-.28).
" See Id. § 1252; 42 Fed. Reg. 62,704-06 (1977) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. §
725.1-.25).
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and 50% for succeeding years.' Section 712(c) appropriates specific sums for grants under section 705: to twenty million dollars
for federal fiscal year 1977 to 1978, thirty million dollars for federal
fiscal years 1978 to 1979 and 1979 to 1980, and "such funds as are
required thereafter. '""
Moreover, section 401(a) of the Act creates an Abandoned
Mine Reclamation Fund."' As its name denotes, the Fund serves
the purpose of financing governmental reclamation of the adverse
effects of past mining operations." The Fund is also, inter alia, for
the purposes of abating emergency conditions caused by mining
operations and for the enhancement of public facilities such as
roads and recreational facilities adversely affected by mining. 8
In order for a state to administer an abandoned mine reclamation program using monies from the Abandoned Mine Reclamation
Fund, it must prepare and OSM must approve an abandoned mine
reclamation program for the state.80 In order to encourage states to
apply for primacy, OSM may not approve and fund a state abandoned mine reclamation program unless the state has an approved
permanent regulatory program. 0
Funding under Title IV of the Act alone will be of great benefit
to the states. Federal funds will substantially increase the ability
of the states afflicted by the destructive legacy of past mining
practices (predominantly the eastern states) to restore the vast
amounts of land and numbers of streams adversely affected by
past mining practices.' These funds will also enable states affected
with sudden sprawl and population growth attendant upon opening new coal reserves (predominantly the western states) to deal
'

Id. § 1295(a).
Id. § 1302(c).

Id. § 1231(a).
This Fund is to be financed by a tonnage assessment on all coal mined in
the United States: 35 cents per ton of coal produced by surface mining and 15 cents
per ton of coal produced by underground mining. Id. Section 402(a) provides that
the assessment shall not exceed ten percent of the value of the coal at the mine. 30
U.S.C.A. § 1231(b) (West Supp. 1978). The section further provides that the fee
for lignite coal shall be 10 cents per ton or two percent of the value of the coal at
the mine, whichever is less. Id.
9930 U.S.C.A. § 1233 (West Supp. 1978).
17

"

Id.

§ 1235.

Id. § 1236(c). But see 43 Fed. Reg. 49,941-42 (1978) (to be codified in 30
C.F.R. § 872.11(b)(5)(vi)).
" See text accompanying notes 4 to 9 supra.
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with the social dislocations caused by "boomtowns." Up to ten
percent of these funds will also be available to fund the cost of
preparation of the determination of hydrologic consequences under
section 507(b)(11) and the statement of test boring results under
section 507(b)(15) by small operators (those who produce under
100,000 tons). 2 This provision will help small operators meet all of
the permit application requirements of the Act and eliminate any
excuses based on economic inability to comply.
2.

OSM as Standard Setter-The
Real World Dichotomy

In addition to its power of the purse, OSM will have a great
impact on state regulatory programs in its role as a standard setter.
As previously noted, OSM was under a duty to issue initial performance standards in the form of regulations by November 3,
1977, and actually issued them on December 13, 1977.11 These
regulations serve as the basis for state enforcement of the initial
regulatory program.
OSM was also under a duty to issue permanent regulations by
August 3, 1978.11 OSM, having missed this deadline, issued self
styled "preferred alternative" regulations in January of 1979.11 The
permanent regulations, finally issued on March 3, 1979,96 will have
the effect of elaborating in detail the minimum standards which a
state regulatory program must meet in order to qualify for primacy. It is unlikely that most of the requirements of the states'
permanent regulatory programs will significantly deviate from federal requirements because of the states' desire to have programs
compatible with the federal regulations, opposition of the various
state coal mining industries to state standards more stringent than
OSM's, and sheer inertia.
Due to their decisive influence on state regulatory programs,
it is important that OSM's permanent regulations establish national standards which are based on and do not detract from the
requirements of the stronger state regulatory programs. Indeed,
,2 30 U.S.C.A. § 1231(b)(1) (West Supp. 1978).

" Id. § 1251(a).
Id. § 1251(b).
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PERMANENT REGULATORY PROGRAM IMPLEMENTING
SECTION 501(B) OF THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977
"

(Appendix C) (1979).
" 44 Fed. Reg. 15,312-463 (1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. §§ 701.1 to 890).
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one of the principal purposes of OSM's standard setting role under
the SMCRA is to prevent the erosion of the stronger state regulatory programs through the movement, or the threat of movement,
by industry to states with weaker regulatory programs."7
The problem with OSM's crucial standard setting role under
the Act is that OSM is largely divorced by the theoretical and
practical necessities of the Act's enforcement scheme from direct,
daily involvement in the application of its standards in the permit
review process and in'enforcement activity. This real world dichotomy is not as acute in the initial regulatory program as in the
permanent program which contemplates only a general federal
supervisory role after a state assumes primacy. Nevertheless, enforcement of the initial regulatory program will, as a matter of
necessity, also be primarily left to the states. "
This lack of intimate connection with the "real world," doubtlessly compounded by the abstract, highly bureaucratized and insular atmosphere of Washington, could lead to well intended but
unenforceable regulations.* It should be emphasized that
"unenforceable in the real world" does not translate into "too
stringent." Rather, it denotes poorly written regulations which reflect a lack of understanding of regulation and enforcement.
As might be expected, examples of this lack of real world
orientation are most readily found in the enforcement sections of
the initial performance regulations. As a threshold matter, the
enforcement sections of the Act reflect an almost complete lack of
understanding of the realities of enforcement. For example, the
enforcement sections of the Act are almost exclusively couched in
terms of liability of the "permittee."l The Act therefore makes
enforcement actions against unpermitted operations very difficult
and, indeed, creates an incentive for operators not to obtain permits. Because the permit review process is necessary to prevent,
rather than belatedly to attempt to cure, the irreversible environmental harm which mining often causes, this deficiency in the
Act's draftsmanship is especially unfortunate.
The initial regulations also reflect a lack of understanding of
how to write legal requirements for effective enforcement. The
most conspicuous example of this lack of understanding was sec30 U.S.C.A. § 1201(g) (West Supp. 1978).
"7See text accompanying notes 55 to 74 supra.
1,30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1268, 1271 (West Supp. 1978).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol81/iss4/3

24

Rochow: The Far Side of Paradox: State Regulation of the Environmental Ef

STATE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
tion 722.17(c)(3), as proposed for the initial performance regulations, but which was providentially excised from the final version100 Section 722.17(c)(3) represented an attempt to set forth
criteria for a mandatory order requiring an operator to show cause
why his permit should not be suspended or revoked under section
521(a)(4) of the Act. Section 722.17(c)(3) read:
The Regional Director [of OSM] shall deem a pattern to exist
if the number of willful violations or violations caused by unwarranted failure to comply with the Act, regulations or permit
conditions is at a rate 50 percent above the national norm during two months of any four month period. The national norm
will be determined by comparing the number of willful and
unwarranted violations issued per inspection day to the permittees in the initial regulatory period. The norm will be determined semi-annually and the norm for the proceeding [sic]
half year will be utilized in determining whether a pattern exists. The national norm may be computed by a sampling or
other statistically-valid method when the data exists [sic] for
the computation.'0 '
The flaws in the "national norm of noncompliance" standard are
patent and manifold. The standard assumes an enforcement program predicated on an assumption of violation, and it creates an
incentive for the industry as a whole to violate the law (so that the
base level of noncompliance will be higher and thus fewer show
cause orders will issue). It is also much too complicated to serve
as the basis of an effective enforcement program; and it is almost
impossible to calculate, much less litigate. Although improved
from their proposed version, the enforcement sections of the final
initial regulations contain unnecessarily convoluted sections which
bespeak an enforcement naivet6. Section 723.12(c)(1) of the initial
regulations speak9 of the "probability of the occurrence of the
event which a violated standard is designed to prevent" as a criterion for assessment of up to fifteen graduated civil penalties
points.""
3.

The Federal Paper Tiger

Related specifically to the question of reinforcement of the
stronger state regulatory programs, as well as generally to the
'

42 Fed. Reg. 44,945 (1977) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 722.17(c)(3)).

Id.
,02
42 Fed. Reg. 62,702-03 (1977) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 723.12(c)(1)).
I
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effective administration of the Act, is the question of how OSM
will exercise its supervisory role over state programs. Endemic to

the federal bureaucracy is an emphasis on form, details, and the
filling out and filing of paperwork. For example, the delegation of
the federal water quality permit program has been characterized
by an extreme emphasis on form pursuant to EPA's state program
regulations and by a lack of emphasis on how the permit programs
delegated to the states have actually been administered and enforced.'0 If OSM follows this course after state permanent regulatory programs have been approved, the SMCRA will become a
nullity and OSM will constitute a facade used to justify the continued existence of weaker state regulatory programs.
4. Compatibility of the SMCRA With State Statutes
The last problem this section will address stems from the poor
draftsmanship of the SMCRA. The Act serves as a classic example
of inept legislative draftsmanship. It is, first of all, internally inconsistent. Words and phrases read differently in different parts of
the statute even when they are apparently referring to the same
basic standard. For example, section 509(a) provides that the
amount of bond shall be calculated upon the cost of reclamation
to the regulatory authority, while section 519(c)(2) provides that
the amount of bond retained to insure continued success of revegetation shall be calculated upon the cost to a third party;"' section
508(a)(3) speaks of "existing land use policies and plans" while
section 508(a)(8) addresses "applicable State and local land use
plans"; 0 5 and section 507(b)(5) requires operators to file a statement regarding permit suspensions or revocations and bond forfeitures for the five years preceding the submission of the application,
while section 510(c) requires operators to file a schedule regarding
violations of environmental laws for a three year period prior to the
date of the permit application.' 8 In addition, vague and undefined
catch words and phrases are strewn promiscuously around the Act.
"Irreparable harm" is a prominent example.'10
See 40 C.F.R. Part 124 (1977).
Compare 30 U.S.C.A. § 1259(a) (West Supp. 1978) with 30 U.S.C.A. §
1269(c)(2) (West Supp. 1978). Experience has indicated that it costs the govern.
ment three to four times more to do the backfilling on defaulted operations than it
costs the operators.
'0 Compare 30 U.S.C.A. § 1258(a)(3) (West Supp. 1978) with 30 U.S.C.A. §
1258(a)(8) (West Supp. 1978).
01Compare Id. § 1257(b)(5) with Id. § 1260(c).
'17 The deficiencies in the SMCRA's enforcement sections are addressed in the
11

'
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Some sections of the Act even embody conflicting requirements. Perhaps the most notable example is section 516(b)(1)
which requires operators to:
adopt measures consistent with known technology in order to
prevent subsidence causing material damage to the extent technologically and economically feasible, maximize mine stability,
and maintain the value and reasonably foreseeable use of such
surface lands, except in those instances where the mining technology used requires planned subsidence in a predictable and
controlled manner: Provided, That nothing in this subsection
shall be construed to prohibit the standard method of room and
pillar mining... I0l
This section has no meaning. Underground mining operations,
whether they use room and pillars or longwall techniques, plan for
subsidence in a predictable and controlled manner in order to maximize mineral extraction and efficiency of operation. The exception is, therefore, inclusive and the first part of the section is meaningless. The exception might arguably be read to refer to longwall
mining techniques. However, to so interpret it would lead to the
absurd result that no subsidence control whatsoever would be imposed on longwall mining operations, even if it were
"technologically and economically feasible" for them to prevent
subsidence damage. The "Provided" clause is a qualification piled
on the other qualifications and is mystifying in context. Section
.516(b)(1) contains so many elastic phrases-"material damage,"
"technologically and economically feasible"-that it cannot fairly
be construed to prohibit anything.
It is an unfortunate fact that the poor draftmanship of the Act
will probably be repeated in much state legislation. Instead of
mechanically adopting the Act verbatim, states should attempt to
adopt more lucid, enforceable and effective legislation to fulfill the
spirit of the Act.
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORY
PROGRAMS-RESOLVING THE PARADOX

The success or failure of the SMCRA depends upon how OSM
resolves the paradoxical approach to state regulation which constitutes the core of the Act's regulatory requirements. In order for the
text accompanying notes 93 to 102, supra..
"A 30 U.S.C.A. § 1266(a)(1) (West Supp. 1978).
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Act to be effective, OSM must require the states to develop and
enforce their own second and third stage regulatory programs and
to overcome their legacy of inadequate first stage regulation. OSM
itself, on the other hand, must continue to superintend state programs in order to insure their continued effectiveness and in order
to reinforce strong state regulatory programs. A definitive conclusion about OSM's ability, competence and resolve to require states
to enforce the Act cannot be reached until sometime after the Act's
deadline of June 3, 1980 for OSM's approval or disapproval of state
primacy plans. 09 However, OSM's administration of the Act's initial regulatory program, OSM's permanent regulations," and its
communications with various interested parties-including
states-provide a basis for a provisional conclusion.
A.

The Initial Regulatory Program-Enforcement

The initial regulatory program has had some success. OSM
inspectors have made inspections, have issued notices of violations, and OSM has itself taken some enforcement actions."' Although reliable statistics regarding the relative frequency and
effectiveness of state inspections and enforcement actions before
and after the advent of the initial regulatory program are not available, it appears that initial regulation under the Act has generally
resulted in some strengthening of state regulatory programs. For
example, in the southern appalachian states, state inspectors are
learning how to prepare cases for court as a result of enforcement
actions brought under the initial regulatory program." 2 Under the
impetus of the initial regulatory program, state inspectors in some
western states are now taking water samples when they make
inspections, and New Mexico has hired its first surface mining
inspector."3 Moreover, at this writing, most coal producing states
have adopted their own legislation authorizing enforcement of the
initial regulatory standards."'
10930

U.S.C.A. § 1254 (West Supp. 1978).
44 Fed Reg. 15,311-463 (1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. §§ 700.1 to 890).
" See OSM's Cummulative Assessments Statistics as of Jan. 26, 1979 (Dep't
of the Interior, Jan. 1979). These statistics reveal that up to January 26, 1979, OSM
issued 708 notices of violations, 203 cessation orders and 1,511 notices of civil
penalty violations under the initial regulatory programs.
"I Conversation with an undisclosed official of OSM regional office (Jan. 26,
1979).
"'

MIConversation with an undisclosed official of OSM regional office (March 19,
1979).
"I

Some amendments to state laws have simply incorporated the initial per-
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Although some incremental gains have been made in mining
regulation under the initial regulatory program, the effectiveness
of the program is still very much in doubt. After an extensive
review of OSM's inspection records, the Center for Law and Social
Policy concluded that federal inspections under the initial regulatory program (which are to serve as a model for state inspections)
5
were inadequate in frequency and result." Inspection shortcomfailure to take enforceand
ings included failure to cite violations
violations.
discovered
to
response
in
ment action
The Initial Regulatory Program-TheRetreat From Substantive Requirements

B.

While it appears as though OSM is undertaking a good faith
effort to get inspectors out in the field to ascertain compliance with
the initial regulatory standards, an examination of the substance
of the initial regulatory program reveals OSM's performance to be
seriously, perhaps fatally, inadequate. The inadequacies of inspections under the initial regulatory program can be at least partially
justified on the grounds of insufficient staffing and enforcement
inexperience. West Virginia has apparently had the most correspondence with OSM of any of the states in this regard. Of that
correspondence, the most illuminating is the Heine-Callaghan letter.
In September of 1978, Walter Heine, Director of OSM, wrote
a letter to David Callaghan, Director of the West Virginia Department of Natural Resources (DNR), in which he purported to summarize understandings reached between OSM and DNR regarding
the substantive requirements of the initial regulatory standards as
applied to West Virginia."6 The essence of the letter, stripped of
formance standards by reference or by implication. West Virginia's legislation is
typical: "The legislature does hereby intend to expand the authority of the department and the commission to issue permits in compliance with federal law." W. VA.
CODE

§ 20-6-23a (Cum. Supp. 1978).

M Letter from Center for Law and Social Policy to Walter Heine, Director,

OSM, U.S. Dep't of the Interior (Dec. 21, 1978).

"6Letter from Walter Heine, Director, OSM, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to
David Callaghan, Director of West Virginia Dep't of Natural Resources (Sept. 31,
1978). The Heine-Callaghan letter discusses ten issues designated in subheadings:

valley or head-of-hollow fills; haul road drainage; post-mining land use; groundwater monitoring; outcrop barrier; section 522(e); top-of-fill drainage control; continued funding and hiring practices; division of labor; and authority of DNR. An
example of the tone and spirit of the Heine-Callaghan letter is contained in its
discussion of culvert requirements for haul roads:
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equivocal rhetoric, is that West Virginia's regulations are sufficiently stringent to meet the requirements of the initial regulatory
program. Although the Heine-Callaghan letter discusses many issues, and purports to grant West Virginia a number of unauthorized exemptions from the initial regulatory requirements of the Act
and OSM's regulations, its discussion of hydrologic monitoring
requirements illustrates the obfuscatory manner in which the letter waives federal requirements:
In recognition of Section 101(f) of the Federal Act, the requirements of Section 717.17(h)(3) and 717.17(h)(2) of the interim
Federal regulations should be applied primarily with the view
towards assuring adequate monitoring of the quality and quantity of underground waters. Where use of monitoring wells cannot adequately monitor the change in quality and quantity of
underground water, DNR [the West Virginia Department of
Natural Resources] may approve alternative means to monitor
the underground water. This is especially relevant where wells
may not assure adequate or accurate monitoring data in the
remote rural areas of West Virginia's mountainous terrain due
to the presence of multiple aquifers or underground streams. In
conducting inspections, OSM will be guided by West Virginia
requirements."?
The last sentence of the quotation controls the entire paragraph
because inspections and any subsequent enforcement actions will
determine what requirements are enforced. But, contrary to the
implication of the paragraph, the purported adoption ("guided by"
is a delicate bureacratic euphemism in this context) of the West
While West Virginia culverts are only designed [under the requirements
of state law] to a one year [,] 24-hour [precipitation] event, we
[OSM] understand that associated control structures such as basins and
standpipes, as well as the number of such structures which are required,
should adequately handle a 10-year, 24-hour [precipitation] event.
Id. In other words, according to OSM, a structure designed to handle a 1-year, 24hour precipitation event is adequate to handle a 10-year, 24-hour precipitation
event. The reference to "associated structures" does not detract from this conclusion. In generally accepted engineering practice, associated structures should fit the
1-year, 24-hour design of the culvert. If they are designed to handle a greater flow
than the culvert, flooding could occur. If anything, associated structures should be
designed to handle less flow than the culvert in order to diminish the possibility of
flooding. Although the hydrologic monitoring requirements imposed by he initial
program are not as comprehensive as the equivalent requirements of the permanent
program, they represent a transition between second and third stage regulation and
serve as a crucial test of the effectiveness of the initial program.
"I Id. [emphasis added].
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Virginia hydrological requirements by OSM will not result in the
use of scientifically accurate monitoring methods which would increase environmental protection. In practice, West Virginia requires hydrologic monitoring only if an operation is within one-half
mile of a well or spring."1
OSM's purported adoption of West Virginia requirements has
caused it to lose enforcement actions it has brought charging operators with violations of more stringent federal standards. In
Carbon Fuel Co. v. OSM,"9 a coal company appealed specified
notices of violations, cessation orders, and notices of civil penalty
assessments which OSM had issued against it under sections 518
and 521 of the Act. 20 The administrative law judge vacated all the
orders and notices that remained in contention at the hearing
stage. The opinion and order of vacation in CarbonFuel was based
specifically on the Heine-Callaghan letter. Finding the operator to
have been in compliance with the applicable West Virginia regulations on the dates the violations were charged, the opinion in
Carbon Fuel stated:
Although the Respondent did not specifically argue that the
West Virginia statutes were not consistent with corresponding
statutes of the Act, it is undisputed that Walter N. Heine, P.E.,
Director of the Office of Surface Mining, in a letter to Mr. David
Callaghan, Director, West Virginia Department of Natural Resources (Appl. Exh. 1), stated that, 'OSM recognizes the Department of Natural Resources as the State's regulatory authority as that term is defined in section 700.5 of the interim Federal
regulations. Chapter 20, Article 6 of the Code of West Virginia
and the rules and regulations promulgated by the West Virginia
Department of Natural Resources on August 14, 1978, are essentially in compliance with, and adequate to implement, the initial regulatory program.' Having made such representation, the
Respondent would also be estopped from denying that such
application of the West Virginia regulations, to Applicant's permit would amount
to compliance with the Act and the interim
2
regulations. '

The estoppel rationale is more properly confined to bilateral or
118J.

Pittsenbarger, Div. of Reclamation Chief, W. Va. Dep't. of Natural Resources, Memorandum to All Field Personnel (Oct. 2, 1978).
M'Nos. CH9-1-R, CH9-2-R, CH9-2-P, CH9-3-P, CH9-6-P (U.S. Dep't of the
Interior, Office of Hearings and Appeals, issued Jan. 12, 1979).
11030 U.S.C.A. §§ 1268, 1271 (West Supp. 1978).
121U.S. Dep't of the Interior, supra note 11, at 6.
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multilateral agreements not involving the exercise of the police
power and is not persuasive in Carbon Fuel.'" Rather, the question
presented is the legality of the Heine-Callaghan letter. Rulings or
regulations by administrative agencies which are contrary to the
governing statutes under which they are"issued are not lawful and
therefore are not legally effective.'1' Because West Virginia's requirements are, in important respects, less stringent than equivalent requirements of the initial program prescribed by the Act,
OSM's adoption of them is legally ineffective under a theoretical
analysis. As a practical matter, however, neither operators nor
OSM will be interested in challenging the legality of the HeineCallaghan letter. In any event, as CarbonFuel indicates, adjudicatory bodies-will be reluctant to uphold, if only out of a generalized
sense of fairness, OSM's attempts to enforce federal requirements
which are more stringent than the state standards OSM has purported to adopt.
Another immediate consequence of the Heine-Callaghan letter is discriminatory enforcement. In C & K Coal Co. v. OSM, ," a
Pennsylvania operator appealed, inter alia, a notice of violation
issued by OSM for failure to meet the hydrologic monitoring requirements of the initial regulatory program. Although the administrative law judge found that the operator was in compliance with
Pennsylvania's hydrologic monitoring requirements, he upheld the
notice of violation on the ground that compliance with state requirements is not a defense to an action for violation of the federally mandated requirements of the initial regulatory program. 25
Although C & K Coal was correctly decided, the contrast between
it, the Heine-Callaghan letter and Carbon Fuel highlights the discriminatory effects of OSM's administration of the Act, even at
this early date. Operators in one state must follow the statutory
scheme and comply with the initial regulatory requirements regardless of whether or not they also comply with state requirements. In contrast, operators in another state may flout the statutory scheme and fail to comply with the initial regulatory requirements because of the affirmative action of OSM in sanctioning
In See Commonwealth v. Barnes &Tucker Co., 455 Pa. 392, 414-417, 319 A.2d
871, 883-84 (1974). This article will not address the legality of the Heine-Callaghan
letter's mode of adoption.
" Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 452 Pa. 77, 306 A.2d 319 (1973).
£2 No. CH8-2-R (U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Office of Hearings and Appeals,
issued Nov. 17, 1978).
'" Id. at 3-4.
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state requirements which are less stringent than the initial regulatory standards prescribed by the Act and OSM's own regulations.
This result blatantly contradicts the initial regulatory program's
purpose of requiring the states to "catch up" to second stage regulatory requirements, and the Act's purpose of establishing minimum national standards to prevent continued economic advantage
to states with weak regulatory programs.'26
C.

The PermanentRegulatory Program

The implications of the Heine-Callaghan letter and surrounding events assume more importance in light of OSM's proposed
permanent regulations.2' The single most important set of decisions OSM will make involves the approval or disapproval of the
primacy applications of individual states. The Act requires that in
order to qualify for primacy, a state must have a regulatory program, including legislation and rules and regulations at least as
stringent as federal requirements.28 OSM has included a section
in its permanent regulations which has become known as the
"state window" exception:
Standards and procedures for approval of alternatives to provisions of the regulations of this Chapter.
As part of its program submission or as an amendment to
an approved State program, a State may request approval for
alternatives to provisions of the regulations of this Chapter. For
each alternative provision the State shall(a) Identify the provision in the regulations of this
Chapter for which the alternative is requested;
(b) Describe the alternative proposed and provide
statutory or regulatory language to be used to implement the alternative and;
(c) Explain how and submit data, analysis and information, including identification of sources, demonstrating(1) that the proposed alternative will be in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Act and be
consistent with the regulations; and
126 See 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1252, 1201 (West Supp. 1978); see also text accompanying notes 116 to 125 supra.
" See 44 Fed. Reg. 15,311-463 (1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. §§ 700.1 to

890).

" 30 U.S.C.A. § 1253 (West Supp. 1978).
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(2) that the proposed alternative is necessary because of local environmental or agricultural conditions."
This provision allows OSM great discretion in approving or disapproving state primacy plans.'11 It contains no criteria whatsoever
for evaluating the stringency and effectiveness of proposed state
alternatives.13 ' The "state window" variance provision will encourage and permit arbitrary and politicized decisionmaking and can
result in approval of state programs or subsequent state program
amendments which do not meet the requirements of the permanent regulatory program. The ultimate result of the "state window" exception, especially when read in the context of OSM's
execution of the Heine-Callaghan letter, may well be that federal
action will itself undercut strong state regulatory programs in direct contradiction to the purposes of the Act.
Even assuming that the "state window" exception were less
open ended than it appears, the practical problems of applying it
to meet the requirements of the permanent regulatory program
and to reinforce, not weaken, strong state regulatory programs are
illustrated by the remarks of Governor John D. Rockefeller, IV,
of West Virginia. With respect to the hydrologic monitoring requirements of the initial regulatory program, Rockefeller stated:
44 Fed. Reg. 15,324 (1979)(to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 731.13).
This conclusion is not contradicted by the requirement of § 731.13(c)(1) that
any state alternative must be in accordance with the Act and consistent with the
regulations. Section 730.5 of the permanent regulations defines "consistent with"
and "in accordance with" as they relate to the Act and the regulations in the
following manner:
(a) With regard to the Act, the State laws and regulations are no less
stringent than, meet the minimum requirements of and include all applicable provisions of the Act.
(b) With regard to the Secretary's regulations, are no less stringent than
and meet the applicable provisions of the regulations of this chapter.
44 Fed. Reg. 15,324 (1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 730.5) [emphasis added].
Under this definition, state primacy programs will not have to include, at OSM's
discretion, all of the requirements of OSM's regulations. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the "state window" was lawfully adopted, under familar principles of
deference to agency interpretation, OSM will be allowed great latitude in deciding
whether a given state's requirements are consistent with the permanent federal
requirements. See In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 456 F. Supp. 1301
(D.D.C. 1978). In any event, the "local requirements" clause of § 731.13 purports
to afford OSM broad discretion because of its vague language.
"I This should be contrasted with 44 Fed. Reg 15,315-16 (1979) (to be codified
in 30 C.F.R. § 700.13) (this section specifies in detail what must be contained in
citizen's notice).
'
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The most significant of [OSM's] enforcement activities, however, is with regard to the failure to have the required underground water monitoring system. No one in OSM has told us,
or the industry, what is an acceptable groundwater monitoring
system, or how the data collected by such a system is to be
used ....
• . . When we ask OSM to define for us exactly how to
monitor groundwater, they can't tell us. 32
Governor Rockefeller's remarks and the Heine-Callaghan undertaking indicate that states are much more likely to argue, and
OSM to accept, the position that their current less stringent regulations should be part of the broadly discretionary state window
variance, rather than presenting effective alternatives which meet
the federal requirements.3 Thus the ultimate effect of the "state
window" will be to sanction state programs which do not meet the
requirements of the permanent regulatory program.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Act's requirement of basic minimum second stage regulation and prevgntive, comprehensive third stage regulation represents a national response to the state's historically inadequate regulation of coal mining's environmental effects. Paradoxically, the
Act vests primary responsibility for its administration and enforcement with the states. OSM must successfully resolve the paradox
inherent in the Act and require the states to overcome their past
history of lax enforcement by developing their own regulatory programs to meet the Act's requirements. Although a definitive conclusion would be premature, one can provisionally conclude on the
basis of current developments that OSM will not effectively resolve
the federal-state paradox. Such a failure will result in a federal
sanctioning of weaker state regulatory programs and a federal undercutting of stronger state regulatory programs.
' Excerpts of Prepared Remarks of Governor John D. Rockefeller, IV, Before
the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee at 2, 5 (press release issued
Sept. 11, 1978). The gravamen of Governor Rockefeller's testimony, which took
place several weeks before OSM executed the Heine-Callaghan letter, was that
West Virginia's standards were adequate to meet the requirements of the initial
regulatory program. In addition, Governor Rockefeller called for a congressional
investigation of the "background and philosophies" of OSM staff.
'3 Moreover, the hydrologic monitoring requirements of the permanent regulations are generally framed and do not "tell" the industry or the states what to do.
44 Fed. Reg. 15,402-03 (1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 816.52).
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